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Two Sorts of Dualism: McDowell's Oscillation Between a Transcendental and a Metaphysical Conception of Reason and Nature
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
2009 (English)In: Sats: Nordic Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 1600-1974, Vol. 10, no 1, 53-77 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In Mind and World, John McDowell tries to achieve a reconciliation between reason and nature. In his view, this pursuit derives its motivation from the modern conception of nature as the space of law, which seems to relegate human rationality to a state of utter isolation from man's nature as an animal. Accordingly, we need to rethink the modern understanding of nature in such a way as to make room for a notion of “second nature”, in which human reason may properly be situated. In this article I argue, from a phenomenological point of view, that McDowell's proposed solution to the problem of dualism is unsatisfactory, basically because it seeks to combine two radically different perspectives on experience: as a vehicle of reasons and meaning and as a transaction in nature respectively. But, it is suggested, that kind of reconciliation is neither possible, nor even desirable. At bottom, it rests on a confusion of transcendental with metaphysical issues.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2009. Vol. 10, no 1, 53-77 p.
Keyword [en]
dualism, experience, McDowell, nature, phenomenology, space of law, space of reasons, transcendental philosophy
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Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-28173DOI: 10.1515/SATS.2009.53OAI: diva2:222710
Available from: 2009-06-09 Created: 2009-06-09 Last updated: 2015-10-07Bibliographically approved

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Weigelt, Charlotta
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