Francescotti on Fission
2009 (English)In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0279-0750, E-ISSN 1468-0114, Vol. 90, no 4, 476-481 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Most versions of the psychological-continuity approach to personal identity (PCA) contain a ‘non-branching’ requirement. Recently, Robert Francescotti has argued that while such versions of PCA handle Parfit's standard fission case well, they deliver the wrong result in the case of an intact human brain. To solve this problem, he says, PCA-adherents need to add a clause that runs contrary to the spirit of their theory. In this response, I argue that Francescotti's counterexample fails. As a result, the revision he suggests is not needed.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2009. Vol. 90, no 4, 476-481 p.
Research subject Practical Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-31678DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01350.xISI: 000271714000003OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-31678DiVA: diva2:278153