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Francescotti on Fission
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
2009 (English)In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0279-0750, E-ISSN 1468-0114, Vol. 90, no 4, 476-481 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Most versions of the psychological-continuity approach to personal identity (PCA) contain a ‘non-branching’ requirement. Recently, Robert Francescotti has argued that while such versions of PCA handle Parfit's standard fission case well, they deliver the wrong result in the case of an intact human brain. To solve this problem, he says, PCA-adherents need to add a clause that runs contrary to the spirit of their theory. In this response, I argue that Francescotti's counterexample fails. As a result, the revision he suggests is not needed.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2009. Vol. 90, no 4, 476-481 p.
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Practical Philosophy
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-31678DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01350.xISI: 000271714000003OAI: diva2:278153
Available from: 2009-11-24 Created: 2009-11-24 Last updated: 2012-10-24Bibliographically approved

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