Fitting Attitudes, Welfare, and Time
2009 (English)In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 12, no 3, 247-256 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Chris Heathwood has recently put forward a novel and ingenious argument against the view that intrinsic value is analyzable in terms of fitting attitudes. According to Heathwood, this view holds water only if the related but distinct concept of welfare — intrinsic value for a person—can be analyzed in terms of fitting attitudes too. Moreover, he argues against such an analysis of welfare by appealing to the rationality of our bias towards the future. In this paper, I argue that so long as we keep the tenses and the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction right, the fitting-attitudes analysis of welfare can be shown to survive Heathwood’s criticism.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2009. Vol. 12, no 3, 247-256 p.
Intrinsic value, Welfare, Fitting attitudes, Bias towards the future
Research subject Practical Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-31679DOI: 10.1007/s10677-009-9161-yOAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-31679DiVA: diva2:278157