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In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
2009 (English)In: Mind and language, ISSN 0268-1064, E-ISSN 1468-0017, Vol. 24, 297-327 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing ‘phenomenal’ properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. Moreover, in contrast to sui generis views, it can quite easily account for the rational or reason providing role of experience.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2009. Vol. 24, 297-327 p.
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Theoretical Philosophy
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-31686DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2009.01364.xISI: 000266844300003OAI: diva2:278184
Available from: 2009-11-24 Created: 2009-11-24 Last updated: 2010-11-17Bibliographically approved

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Glüer, Kathrin
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