2005 (English)In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 71, no 3, 203-214 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
The Belief-Desire model (the B-D model) of reasons for action has been subject to much criticism lately. Two of the most elaborate and trenchant expositions of such criticisms are found in recent works by Jonathan Dancy (2000) and Fred Stoutland (2002). In this paper we set out to respond to the central pieces of their criticisms. For this purpose it is essential to sort out and regiment different senses in which the term ‘reason’ may be used. It is necessary to go beyond common philosophical practice and distinguish not merely between two such different uses but to make a tripartite distinction. Our aim is largely conciliatory: we grant the main parts of the points made by Stoutland and Dancy but argue that once the B-D model has been properly stated, and different uses of the term ‘reason’ sufficiently regimented, the B-D proponent is able to accommodate their respective criticisms within the framework of the B-D model and thereby undermine their case against the model.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2005. Vol. 71, no 3, 203-214 p.
reasons, beliefs, desires, states of affairs, propositions, Dancy, Stoutland
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-31705DOI: 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2005.tb00884.xOAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-31705DiVA: diva2:278288