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G. E. Moore on Goodness and Reasons
Brasenose College, University of Oxford, UK.
2006 (English)In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 84, no 4, 525-534 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Several proponents of the ‘buck-passing’ account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said for and against the buck-passing account and Moore's views about goodness and reasons.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2006. Vol. 84, no 4, 525-534 p.
Keyword [en]
G. E. Moore, value, reasons, buck-passing
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-31706DOI: 10.1080/00048400601079029OAI: diva2:278290
Available from: 2009-11-25 Created: 2009-11-25 Last updated: 2015-08-12Bibliographically approved

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Olson, Jonas
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