G. E. Moore on Goodness and Reasons
2006 (English)In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 84, no 4, 525-534 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Several proponents of the ‘buck-passing’ account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said for and against the buck-passing account and Moore's views about goodness and reasons.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2006. Vol. 84, no 4, 525-534 p.
G. E. Moore, value, reasons, buck-passing
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-31706DOI: 10.1080/00048400601079029OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-31706DiVA: diva2:278290