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Expressivism and Moral Certitude
Jesus College, Oxford, UK.
Brasenose College, Oxford, UK.
2009 (English)In: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 59, no 235, 202-215 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucialstructural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting forsubjects’ certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge haveindependently constructed ‘ecumenical’ versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection.We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view whichincorporates both non-cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith’s challenge, it isunlikely that ‘purer’ and more familiar versions of non-cognitivism will succeed.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2009. Vol. 59, no 235, 202-215 p.
Keyword [en]
expressivism, certitude, Lenman, Ridge, Smith
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-31708DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.580.xOAI: diva2:278294
Available from: 2010-01-25 Created: 2009-11-25 Last updated: 2015-08-12Bibliographically approved

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