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Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
2009 (English)In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 12, no 4, 365-378 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

According to ‘Fitting Attitude’ (FA) analyses of value, for an object to be valuable isfor that object to have properties—other than its being valuable—that make it a fitting object ofcertain responses. In short, if an object is positively valuable it is fitting to favour it; if anobject is negatively valuable it is fitting to disfavour it. There are several variants of FAanalyses. Some hold that for an object to be valuable is for it to be such that it ought to befavoured; others hold that value is analyzable in terms of reasons or requirements to favour.All these variants of the FA analysis are subject to a partiality challenge: there arecircumstances in which some agents have reasons to favour or disfavour some object—due tothe personal relations in which they stand to the object—without this having any bearing onthe value of the object. A. C. Ewing was one of the first philosophers to draw attention to thepartiality challenge for FA analyses. In this paper I explain the challenge and considerEwing's responses, one of which is preferable to the other, but none of which is entirelysatisfactory. I go on to develop an alternative Brentano-inspired response that Ewing couldhave offered and that may well be preferable to the responses Ewing actually did offer.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2009. Vol. 12, no 4, 365-378 p.
Keyword [en]
A. C. Ewing, FA analyses, fittingness, ought, partiality, value, wrong kind of reason problem
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-31710DOI: 10.1007/s10677-009-9176-4ISI: 000270838600004OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-31710DiVA: diva2:278296
Available from: 2010-01-25 Created: 2009-11-25 Last updated: 2017-12-12Bibliographically approved

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