Instability of matchings in decentralized markets with various preference structures
2008 (English)In: International Journal of Game Theory, ISSN 0020-7276, Vol. 35, 409-420 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
In any two-sided matching market, a stable matching can be found by a central agency using the deferred acceptance procedure of Gale and Shapley. But if the market is decentralized and information is incomplete then stability of the ensuing matching is not to be expected. Despite the prevalence of such matching situations, and the importance of stability, little theory exists concerning instability. We discuss various measures of instability and analyze how they interact with the structure of the underlying preferences. Our main result is that even the outcome of decentralized matching with incomplete information can be expected to be “almost stable” under reasonable assumptions.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2008. Vol. 35, 409-420 p.
Stable matching, Blocking pair, Instability, Preference structure, Decentralized market, Maximin matching·
Research subject Mathematics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-31721DOI: 10.1007/s00182-007-0081-6OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-31721DiVA: diva2:278366