Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
2006 (English)In: Mathematical Social Sciences, ISSN 0165-4896, Vol. 52, 77-87 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
We consider stable three-dimensional matchings of three genders (3GSM). Alkan [Alkan, A., 1988. Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings. Mathematical Social Sciences 16, 207 instances of 3GSM allow stable matchings. Boros et al. [Boros, E., Gurvich, V., Jaslar, S., Krasner, D., 2004. Stable matchings in three-sided systems with cyclic preferences. Discrete Mathematics 286, 1 that if preferences are cyclic, and the number of agents is limited to three of each gender, then a stable matching always exists. Here we extend this result to four agents of each gender.We also show that a number of well-known sufficient conditions for stability do not apply to cyclic 3GSM. Based on computer search, we formulate a conjecture on stability of –209] showed that not all–10] showed“strongest link” 3GSM, which would imply stability of cyclic 3GSM.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2006. Vol. 52, 77-87 p.
Stable matching, 3GSM, Cyclic preferences, Balanced game, Effectivity function
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-32098DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.005OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-32098DiVA: diva2:279456