Sleeping Beauty Meets Monday
2010 (English)In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 174, no 3, 397-412 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
The Sleeping Beauty problem—first presented by A. Elga in aphilosophical context—has captured much attention. The problem, we contend, ismore aptly regarded as a paradox: apparently, there are cases where one ought tochange one’s credence in an event’s taking place even though one gains no new informationor evidence, or alternatively, one ought to have a credence other than 1/2 inthe outcome of a future coin toss even though one knows that the coin is fair. In thispaper we argue for two claims. First, that Sleeping Beauty does gain potentially newrelevant information upon waking up on Monday. Second, his credence shift is warrantedprovided it accords with a calculation that is a result of conditionalization onthe relevant information: “this day is an experiment waking day” (a day within theexperiment on which one is woken up). Since Sleeping Beauty knows what days dcould refer to, he can calculate the probability that the referred to waking day is aMonday or a Tuesday providing an adequate resolution of the paradox.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2010. Vol. 174, no 3, 397-412 p.
Credence · Conditionalization · Referential knowledge · Sleeping Beauty problem · Probability
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-32190DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9464-5ISI: 000277182700007OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-32190DiVA: diva2:279704