The Puzzle of Dogmatism Repuzzled
2010 (English)In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 148, no 2, 307-321 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Harman and Lewis credit Kripke with having formulated a puzzle that seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. The puzzle is widely regarded as having been solved. In this paper we argue that this standard solution, in its various versions, addresses only a limited aspect of the puzzle and holds no promise of fully resolving it. Analyzing this failure and the proper rendering of the puzzle, it is suggested that it poses a significant challenge for the defense of epistemic closure.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer , 2010. Vol. 148, no 2, 307-321 p.
Principle of epistemic closure, Dogmatism, Gettier counter examples, Evidence, Kripke, Harman, Sorensen, Hawthorne.
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-32191DOI: 10.1007/s11098-008-9330-1ISI: 000275462300010OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-32191DiVA: diva2:279705