Assertion Not Possibly Social
2009 (English)In: Journal of Pragmatics, ISSN 0378-2166, Vol. 41, 2563-2567 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
In his paper ‘Why assertion may yet be social’ (Pegan, this issue), Philip Pegan directs two main criticisms against my earlier paper ‘Is assertion social?’ (Pagin, 2004). I argued that what I called ‘‘social theories’’, are inadequate, and I suggested a method for generating counterexamples to them: types of utterance which are not assertions by intuitive standards, but which are assertion by the standards of those theories. Pegan’s first criticism is that I haven’t given an acceptable characterization of the class of social theories. His second criticism is that I have overlooked some alternatives, and that there are social theories that are not affected by my argument. In Section 1 I discuss the first, and in Section 2 the second.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2009. Vol. 41, 2563-2567 p.
Assertion, Pegan, social nature
Research subject Theoretical Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-33237DOI: 10.1016/j.pragma.2008.12.014OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-33237DiVA: diva2:282752