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Assertion Not Possibly Social
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. (Theoretical Philosophy)
2009 (English)In: Journal of Pragmatics, ISSN 0378-2166, Vol. 41, 2563-2567 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In his paper ‘Why assertion may yet be social’ (Pegan, this issue), Philip Pegan directs two main criticisms against my earlier paper ‘Is assertion social?’ (Pagin, 2004). I argued that what I called ‘‘social theories’’, are inadequate, and I suggested a method for generating counterexamples to them: types of utterance which are not assertions by intuitive standards, but which are assertion by the standards of those theories. Pegan’s first criticism is that I haven’t given an acceptable characterization of the class of social theories. His second criticism is that I have overlooked some alternatives, and that there are social theories that are not affected by my argument. In Section 1 I discuss the first, and in Section 2 the second.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2009. Vol. 41, 2563-2567 p.
Keyword [en]
Assertion, Pegan, social nature
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Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-33237DOI: 10.1016/j.pragma.2008.12.014OAI: diva2:282752
Available from: 2009-12-21 Created: 2009-12-21 Last updated: 2012-07-03Bibliographically approved

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