Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Incentives in the Welfare-State: Lessons for would-be welfare states
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
1996 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This paper deals with economic incentives and welfare-state arrangements in OECD countries; it also offers some lessons for would-be welfare states. These arrangements differ, of course, among OECD countries. In particular, there is wide variation in the extent to which countries rely on four basic institutions - the state, the firm, the family and the market. Countries also differ in their reliance on (i) a common safety net, often in the form of flat-rate benefits tied to specific contingencies; (ii) means-tested benefits for low-income groups; and (iii) income protection, i.e., benefits that are tied to previous income. Another distinction between corporatist welfare states, where benefits are tied to labor contracts, and universal welfare states in which benefits are conditional on residence or citizenship. This distinction is blurred, however, by recent tendencies in corporatist welfare states to extend coverage to individuals who have very weak attachment to the labor market, and in universal welfare states to tie benefits to previous or contemporary work under the slogan "workfare" rather than "welfare".The degree of generosity of benefits is another important distinction. Of course, the lower the benefit levels, the stronger the incentives for citizens to opt for voluntary (market) solutions, in the form of private saving and private insurance arrangements.When considering incentive problems in connection with various types of welfare-state arrangements, this paper emphasizes what may be called "dynamic" issues, i.e., incentive effects that evolve over time. These also include endogenous changes in social norms among individuals and endogenous adjustments in political behavior. This approach also makes it necessary to broaden the analysis to fields outside conventionally defined "economic analysis".

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: IIES , 1996. , 33 p.
Series
Seminar Paper / Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, ISSN 0347-8769 ; 604
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-40892OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-40892DiVA: diva2:327127
Available from: 2010-06-29 Created: 2010-06-28 Last updated: 2010-08-12Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

fulltext(80 kB)249 downloads
File information
File name FULLTEXT01.pdfFile size 80 kBChecksum SHA-512
fb967af3702699bb3de110def71a3034ebda277f0753612aacd205176280c2f48744e84d8f62b0b2b97ac9a36b5388783ec1ee157a976bb243cf9208f11bc775
Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Lindbeck, Assar
By organisation
Institute for International Economic Studies
Economics

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
Total: 249 downloads
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

urn-nbn

Altmetric score

urn-nbn
Total: 75 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf