Strategic Saving and Non-Negative Gifts
1997 (English)Report (Other academic)
O'Connell and Zeldes (1993) have shown that the dynamic inefficiency result of a standard gift model is reversed if parents can undersave strategically. I impose an explicit non-negativity constraint on gifts, which - for all the numerical examples suggested by O'Connell and Zeldes - alters this result, by making gifts non-operative. However, for other realistic numerical examples, this is not the case.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: IIES , 1997. , 20 p.
Seminar Paper / Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, ISSN 0347-8769 ; 624
Dynamic efficiency, Altruism, Gifts, Overlapping generations, Saving
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-40987OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-40987DiVA: diva2:327671