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Strategic Saving and Non-Negative Gifts
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
1997 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

O'Connell and Zeldes (1993) have shown that the dynamic inefficiency result of a standard gift model is reversed if parents can undersave strategically. I impose an explicit non-negativity constraint on gifts, which - for all the numerical examples suggested by O'Connell and Zeldes - alters this result, by making gifts non-operative. However, for other realistic numerical examples, this is not the case.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: IIES , 1997. , 20 p.
Seminar Paper / Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, ISSN 0347-8769 ; 624
Keyword [en]
Dynamic efficiency, Altruism, Gifts, Overlapping generations, Saving
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-40987OAI: diva2:327671
Available from: 2010-06-30 Created: 2010-06-30 Last updated: 2010-07-02Bibliographically approved

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ReferencesLink to record
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