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Collusion-Proof Yardstick Competition
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
1999 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This paper analyses the incentives for collusion when an industry is regulated by means of yardstick competition. The central assumption is that firms must write collusive side contracts before the revelation of private information and are unable to communicate later. It is shown that optimal collusion-proof regulation demands more high-powered (low-powered) incentives to high-productivity (low-productivity) firms than prescribed by the second-best contract. Collusion is costly to society also when correlation of private information is near perfect. This cintrasts with the result by Laffont and Martimort (1998b), that the cost of collusion vanishes in the limit.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: IIES , 1999. , 39 p.
Series
Seminar Paper / Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, ISSN 0347-8769 ; 674
Keyword [en]
yardstick competition, collusion, regulation
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-41102OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-41102DiVA: diva2:328348
Available from: 2010-07-02 Created: 2010-07-02 Last updated: 2010-08-16Bibliographically approved

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Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf

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CiteExportLink to record
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