Change search
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Union Militancy, External Shocks, and the Accommodation Dilemma
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
1985 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Stabilization policy under centralized wage-setting is represnted as a non-cooperative game between an encompassing union and the government. The dilemma of the government is whether or not to accommodate supply disturbances when it cannot tell if they are due an intentionally militant wage policy or to unforeseen external price shocks. In a single round of wage setting, there is no government strategy which can both guarantee full employment and prevent union militancy. In a repeated game, however, there exists a conditional accommodation policy, which permits accommodation of supply shocks while inducing the union to refrain entirely from a militant wage policy.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: IIES , 1985. , 32 p.
Seminar Paper / Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, ISSN 0347-8769 ; 320
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-41345OAI: diva2:329543
Available from: 2010-07-12 Created: 2010-07-12 Last updated: 2010-07-12Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

fulltext(3991 kB)62 downloads
File information
File name FULLTEXT01.pdfFile size 3991 kBChecksum SHA-512
Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf

By organisation
Institute for International Economic Studies

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
Total: 62 downloads
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

Total: 24 hits
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link