Change search
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Insiders and Outsiders in Wage Determination
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.
1985 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

A firm starts with a group of insiders or seasoned workers. There is also a large pool of outsiders who are initially less productive, but are transformed into insiders after one period of employment. The firm gains from having a large pool of insiders, some of whom may be laid off in bad years. Insiders gain from keeping their numbers small. If the insiders set their wage unilaterally, they will choose a path in this extreme case prevents employment of outsiders even if future employment prospects are good. If the wage path is set by bilateral bargaining, the extra advantage to the firm permits employment of some outsiders in some situations.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: IIES , 1985. , 33 p.
Seminar Paper / Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, ISSN 0347-8769 ; 323
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-41349OAI: diva2:329562
Published in connection with a visit at the IIESAvailable from: 2010-07-12 Created: 2010-07-12 Last updated: 2010-07-12

Open Access in DiVA

fulltext(2814 kB)41 downloads
File information
File name FULLTEXT01.pdfFile size 2814 kBChecksum SHA-512
Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf


Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
Total: 41 downloads
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

Total: 57 hits
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link