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Reputation and Rational Expectations
Institute of Economics, University of Aarhus.
Institute of Economics, University of Aarhus.
1987 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

The paper considers the importance of reputation in relation to disinflationary policies in a continuous time ration expectations model, where the private sector has incomplete information about the true preferences of the government. It is proved that there is a unique equilibrium with the important property that the costs of disinflation arise in the start of the game where the policy has not yet gained credibility.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: IIES , 1987. , 20 p.
Seminar Paper / Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, ISSN 0347-8769 ; 378
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-41560OAI: diva2:331175
Published in connection with a visit at the IIES.Available from: 2010-07-21 Created: 2010-07-21 Last updated: 2010-07-21

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