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Persistent Unemployment as Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
1987 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

The present paper develops some game-theoretic models of a labour market with l firm and n equally productive workers. Although all agents are rational and well-informed, and each of them acts strategically in his own best interest (including the monopsonist firm), unemployment may persist in (subgame perfect) equilibrium for certain combinations of preferences and technology, if employment contracts are sufficiently short. This unemployment is involuntary in the traditional sense that in every period there are unemployed workers whose utility would be higher if employed at the going wage. The result is valid both when wages are set by the workers, and when they are set by the firm.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: IIES , 1987. , 40 p.
Seminar Paper / Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, ISSN 0347-8769 ; 381
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-41563OAI: diva2:331179
Available from: 2010-07-21 Created: 2010-07-21 Last updated: 2010-07-21Bibliographically approved

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