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Political Equilibrium in Representative Democracy
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
1989 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

It is shown in this paper that the Median Voter Theorem lacks robustness in the sense that if voters have (even the slightest) preferences for the competing candidates, beside preferences for their current policy proposals, then no policy in the neighbourhood of the median voter's preferred policy constitutes an equilibrium (in pure strategies). This suggests that this classical theorem does not apply to representative democracy. Indeed, if voters do have candidate preferences, and these are strong enough, the policy-motivated candidates will, in general, adopt differing policy positions in equilibrium, and, under certain qualifications, the equilibrium outcome will be (close ti) a particular utilitarian optimum. More specifically, in a discretized model the policy outcome will lie between the preferred policy of the most popular candidate and this utilitarian optimum.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: IIES , 1989. , 57 p.
Series
Seminar Paper / Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, ISSN 0347-8769 ; 426
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-41613OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-41613DiVA: diva2:331587
Available from: 2010-07-23 Created: 2010-07-23 Last updated: 2010-07-23Bibliographically approved

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CiteExportLink to record
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Citation style
  • apa
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  • Other style
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  • de-DE
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  • en-US
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  • nn-NB
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  • Other locale
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Output format
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