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A New Self-Enforcement Criterion for Extensive-Form Games
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
1989 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This paper develops a new self-envorcement criterion for strategy profiles in finite games in extensive form. The criterion builds on essentially the following test of a strategy profile s*: if a player, at any one of his information sets, would believe that other play according to s* at all points of the games where he lacks evidence of a deviation, given the information available at his information set, would he then be willing to play according to s*? This criterion is stricter than subgame perfection and, in many but not all games, somewhat weaker than sequential equillibrium. In contrast to prevailing refinements, the present approach is not based on perturbations.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: IIES , 1989. , 33 p.
Seminar Paper / Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, ISSN 0347-8769 ; 445
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-41630OAI: diva2:331614
Available from: 2010-07-23 Created: 2010-07-23 Last updated: 2010-07-23Bibliographically approved

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