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Policy Inconsistency and External Debt Service
International Monetary Fund.
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
1990 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

In this paper it is argued that the willingness of debtors to make external debt-service payments reflects, in part, their inability to credibly and permanently suspend debt service. The benefits of a credible debt-service suspension would include increased private investment. Buth this would, in turn, tend to create conditions in which it would then be optimal for the government to resume payments. Thus, debt reamins a threat even after the announcement of suspension of debt service. It follows that the expected benefits of such a suspension are limited and may be offset by penalties imposed by creditors.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: IIES , 1990. , 18 p.
Seminar Paper / Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, ISSN 0347-8769 ; 467
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-41771OAI: diva2:337714
Available from: 2010-08-09 Created: 2010-08-09 Last updated: 2010-08-09Bibliographically approved

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Svensson, Lars E.O.
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