Change search
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
On Self-Enforcement in Extensive-Form Games
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
1990 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This paper discusses the issue of self-enforcement in finite extensive form games. A new criterion is developed which essentially requires that, for any given degree (є) of accuracy, every player's strategy should be locally optimal at each of his information sets under some probabilistic hypothesis about all player's behavior which at least approximately (within є) agrees with the tested profile at all points in the game where his information set provides no evidence of a deviation. Like sequential equilibrium, this criterion is more stringent than subgame perfection but less stringent than ("trembling hand" extensive-form) perfect equilibrium. In contrast to sequential equilibrium, the approach builds in an individualistic and set-theoretic consistency condition which can be viewed as a version of Occam's razor.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: IIES , 1990. , 41 p.
Seminar Paper / Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, ISSN 0347-8769 ; 470
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-41774OAI: diva2:337720
Available from: 2010-08-09 Created: 2010-08-09 Last updated: 2010-08-09Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

fulltext(4882 kB)132 downloads
File information
File name FULLTEXT01.pdfFile size 4882 kBChecksum SHA-512
Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf

By organisation
Institute for International Economic Studies

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
Total: 132 downloads
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

Total: 24 hits
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link