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Strategy Subsets Closed under Rational Behavior
Delhi School of Economics.
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
1990 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

A set of strategy profiles is here said to be closed under rational behavior (curb) of it contains all its best replies. Each curb set contains the support of at least one Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, but there are perfect Nash equilibria that are not contained in any minimal curb set. It is shown that every game with compact strategy sets and continuous payoff functions possesses at least one minimal curb set, that every minimal curb set is identical with its best replies and that it is contained in the set of rationalizable strategy profiles.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: IIES , 1990. , 20 p.
Seminar Paper / Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, ISSN 0347-8769 ; 479
Keyword [en]
rationalizability, Nash equilibrium, minimal sets
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-41786OAI: diva2:337740
Available from: 2010-08-09 Created: 2010-08-09 Last updated: 2010-08-09Bibliographically approved

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