Implementation in Undominated Nash Equilibria without Integer Games
1991 (English)Report (Other academic)
A mechanism which uses neither integer games nor modulo games is shown to implement any social choice function in a production economy with private and (excludable) public goods. More precisely, the socially optimal outcome is the unique undominated Nash equillibrium outcome of a game where each player reports his own preferences and those of two neighbors. This equilibrium also results from the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. There are no equilibria in mixed strategies. The mechanism has a natural interpretation in terms of optimal taxation theory.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: IIES , 1991. , 24 p.
Seminar Paper / Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, ISSN 0347-8769 ; 491
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-41797OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-41797DiVA: diva2:337784
Published in connection with a visit at the IIES.2010-08-092010-08-092010-08-09