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Civil Institutions and Evolution
Delhi School of Economics.
1992 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

The paper examines the relation between civil norms and evolution. The survival of norms in the long run may depend on the evolutionary process and natural selection. The sieve of natural selection may ensure that norms which persist must have minimal efficiency properties. This paper begins wutg a general discussion of evolutionary processes and the survival of civil institutions. It then presents an introductory account of the theory of evolutionary games. It is argued that the model of evolutionary games is more suited to analyzing animal behaviour than the human one. Since it is the latter that is of interest to economists, and attempt is made in this paper to develop some new solution concepts which are more apt for human games.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: IIES , 1992. , 32 p.
Seminar Paper / Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, ISSN 0347-8769 ; 523
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-41841OAI: diva2:337940
Published in connection with a visit at the IIES.Available from: 2010-08-10 Created: 2010-08-10 Last updated: 2010-08-10

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