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The Survival Value of Assuming Others to be Rational
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
1994 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Are the cognitive, or information processing assumptions of non-cooperative game theory consisten with biological evolution? Could rationality and common knowledge of rationality have evolved as a result of natural selection? Previous studies, Banerjee and Weibull [3] and Stahl [29], give some support for the survival of "rational play," but not for information processing: "being right is as good as being smart". In contrast, this study provides an example of a multiple-situation environment where non-rational agents are eliminated. Further, evolution only selects agents with knowledge of rationality. These results contribute to the evolutionary foundation of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies and, in contrast to previous studies, to the cognitive interpretation of this solution concept.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: IIES , 1994. , 32 p.
Seminar Paper / Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, ISSN 0347-8769 ; 571
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-41895OAI: diva2:342833
Available from: 2010-08-11 Created: 2010-08-11 Last updated: 2010-08-11Bibliographically approved

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