Change search
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Collusion Among Interest Groups: Foreign Aid and Rent-Dissipation
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
1996 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This paper develops a game-theoretic model of public policy in a developing country in order to explain a number of empirical regularities. It is shown that under certain circumstances, an increase in government revenue will be completely crowded out by increased rent dissipation, leaving the provision of public goods unaltered. In this model, there are two possible ways in which foreign aid may affect the outcome. First, as foreign aid to a large extent can be seen as general budget support, the paper provides an explanation for why increased disbursements do not necessarily lead to higher provision of public goods. Second, the mere fact that the donor is expected to allocate aid according to the recepients' future needs may increase rent dissipation and reduce the number of periods in which efficient policies can be sustained.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: IIES , 1996. , 33 p.
Seminar Paper / Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, ISSN 0347-8769 ; 610
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-41941OAI: diva2:343118
Available from: 2010-08-12 Created: 2010-08-12 Last updated: 2010-08-12Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

fulltext(4534 kB)292 downloads
File information
File name FULLTEXT01.pdfFile size 4534 kBChecksum SHA-512
Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Svensson, Jakob
By organisation
Institute for International Economic Studies

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
Total: 292 downloads
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

Total: 144 hits
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link