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Separation of Powers and Accountability: Towards a Formal Approach to Comparative Politics
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
Université Libre de Bruxelles.
Bocconi University.
1996 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

A political constitution is like an incomplete contract: it spells out a procedure for making decisions and for delegating power, without specifying the contents of those decisions. This creates a problem: the apponted policymaker could use this power for his own benefit against the interests of the citizens. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials. But elections are not sufficient. Separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps the voters, in two distinct ways. First, it can elicit information held by the appointed officials and not otherwise available to the voters. Second, by playing one body against the other and by aligning the interest of the weaker body with their own, the voters can induce the two bodies to discipline each other. Separation of power only works to the voters' advantage if it is appropriately designed, however, and it can be detrimental if it creates a "common pool" problem. These advantages of separation of powers are present both in Presidential and in Parliamentary democracies. Government appointed rules in Parliamentary democracies must be appropriately designed, however, to prevent collisuon.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: IIES , 1996. , 42 p.
Series
Seminar Paper / Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, ISSN 0347-8769 ; 612
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-41943OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-41943DiVA: diva2:343133
Available from: 2010-08-12 Created: 2010-08-12 Last updated: 2010-08-12Bibliographically approved

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CiteExportLink to record
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Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
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  • vancouver
  • Other style
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  • de-DE
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  • en-US
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  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
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  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
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