Change search
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Endogenous Constitutions
Department of Economics, University of Urbino.
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
2003 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

We present a theory of the choice of alternative democratic constitutions, a majoritarian or a consensual one, in an unequal society. A majoritarian democracy redistributes resources from the collectivity toward relatively few people, and has a relatively small government and low level of taxation. A consensual democracy redistributes resources toward a broader spectrum of social groups but also has a larger government and a higher level of taxation. A consensual system turns out to be preferred by the society when ex ante income inequality is relatively low, while a majoritarian system is chosen when income inequality is relatively high. Moreover, we obtain that consensual democracies should be expected to be ruled more often by center-left coalitions while the right should have an advantage in majoritarian constitutions. Finally, our model also provides a new rationale, based on the endogeneity of the political system, of the positive or absent (rather than negative) association between equality and redistribution transpiring from the cross-sectional evidence of developed countries presented in some recent studies. Some historical and empirical evidence supporting our results is provided.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: IIES , 2003. , 96 p.
Seminar Paper / Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University. (Online), ISSN 1653-610X ; 726
Keyword [en]
endogenous constitutions, consensual democracy, majoritarian democracy, inequallity, heterogeneity, redistribution
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-42117OAI: diva2:343973
Available from: 2010-08-19 Created: 2010-08-17 Last updated: 2010-08-19Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

fulltext(2234 kB)554 downloads
File information
File name FULLTEXT01.pdfFile size 2234 kBChecksum SHA-512
Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf

By organisation
Institute for International Economic Studies

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
Total: 554 downloads
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

Total: 62 hits
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link