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Stochastic Adaptation in Finite Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics. Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE, Barcelona, Spain.
2009 (English)In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, ISSN 0165-1889, Vol. 33, no 8, 1543-1554 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

We analyze stochastic adaptation in finite n  -player games played by heterogeneous populations containing best repliers, better repliers, and imitators. Individuals select strategies by applying a personal learning rule to a sample from a finite history of past play. We give sufficient conditions for convergence to minimal closed sets under better replies and selection of a Pareto dominant such set. Finally, we demonstrate that the stochastically stable states are sensitive to the sample size by showing convergence to the risk-dominant equilibrium for sufficiently small sample size and to the Pareto-dominant equilibrium for sufficiently large sample size in 2×2 coordination games.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2009. Vol. 33, no 8, 1543-1554 p.
Keyword [en]
Heterogeneous agents, Markov chain, Stochastic stability, Pareto dominance, Risk dominance
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-44264DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2009.02.007ISI: 000267269500002OAI: diva2:360716
Available from: 2010-11-04 Created: 2010-11-04 Last updated: 2015-09-17Bibliographically approved

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Josephson, Jens
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