Political Rents in a Non-Corrupt Democracy
2009 (English)In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 93, no 3-4, 355-372 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
A fundamental problem in all political systems is that the people in power may extract rents to
the detriment of the general public. In a democracy, electoral competition and information
provided by the media may keep such rent extraction at bay.We develop a simple model where
rents are decreasing in the degree of political competition and voter information. In line with
our theoretical predictions, we
nd that both increased political competition and increased
local media coverage substantially reduce direct measures of legal political rents among local
governments in a non-corrupt democracy (Sweden).
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2009. Vol. 93, no 3-4, 355-372 p.
Accountability, Political competion, Media, Political rents
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-44293DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.10.008ISI: 000264959400001OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-44293DiVA: diva2:360806