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Political Rents in a Non-Corrupt Democracy
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
2009 (English)In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 93, no 3-4, 355-372 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

A fundamental problem in all political systems is that the people in power may extract rents to

the detriment of the general public. In a democracy, electoral competition and information

provided by the media may keep such rent extraction at bay.We develop a simple model where

rents are decreasing in the degree of political competition and voter information. In line with

our theoretical predictions, we




nd that both increased political competition and increased

local media coverage substantially reduce direct measures of legal political rents among local

governments in a non-corrupt democracy (Sweden).

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2009. Vol. 93, no 3-4, 355-372 p.
Keyword [en]
Accountability, Political competion, Media, Political rents
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-44293DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.10.008ISI: 000264959400001OAI: diva2:360806
Available from: 2010-11-04 Created: 2010-11-04 Last updated: 2011-05-05Bibliographically approved

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