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Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
2010 (English)In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 8, no 1, 34-61 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Each delinquent decides in a noncooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. We characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal to optimal group removal, the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent offenses. The key-player policy turns out to be much more complex because it depends on wages and on the structure of the network. (JEL: A14, C72, K42, L14)

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2010. Vol. 8, no 1, 34-61 p.
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URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-50167ISI: 000274329900003OAI: diva2:381947
authorCount :3Available from: 2010-12-29 Created: 2010-12-21 Last updated: 2010-12-29Bibliographically approved

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Zenou, Yves
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