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Empirical Indefeasibility and Nonfactuality: Assessing Field's Evaluative Approach to the A Priori
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
2010 (English)In: Croatian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 1333-1108, Vol. 10, no 30, 183-197 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Hartry Field has recently presented an original and interesting approach to the a priori. Its main theses are, first, that certain rules are empirically indefeasible and, second, that the reasonableness of these rules are not based on any factual property. After an introduction, Field’s approach is presented in section II. Section III examines his claims concerning empirical indefeasibility. It will be argued that his general argument for empirical indefeasibility fails along with the particular examples of rules he gives. Alternative ways of preserving empirical indefeasibility are suggested that are compatible with overdetermination under certain assumptions. In section IV, Field’s arguments for the nonfactuality of epistemological concepts, such as reasonableness, are found wanting. At the end, an alternative way of understanding the link between the epistemological concept in question and truth-conduciveness is proposed that preserves the factuality of the epistemological concept.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Zagreb: KruZak , 2010. Vol. 10, no 30, 183-197 p.
Keyword [en]
a priori, empirical indefeasibility, Hartry Field, nonfactuality
National Category
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-53549OAI: diva2:390908
Defeasibility and Discourse DependenceAprioriteorier: kritik och alternativ
Swedish Research Council
Available from: 2011-01-24 Created: 2011-01-24 Last updated: 2011-04-12Bibliographically approved

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Janvid, Mikael
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