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Judiciaries in Corrupt Societies
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
2011 (English)In: Economics of Governance, ISSN 1435-6104, E-ISSN 1435-8131, Vol. 12, no 1, 75-88 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Accepted
Abstract [en]
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Recent empirical work shows that judicial dependence can explain high levels of corruption. This paper examines how the dependence of judiciaries influences corruption at different levels of the government in a model where the central government, low-level officials, and the judiciary are corrupt. In the model, the central government sells offices to low-level officials and demands ex-post payments enforced by the judiciary. Because an independent judiciary can rule against the central authority and accept bribes from stealing low-level officials, it reduces corruption at the higher level of government but promotes corruption at the lower level. Therefore, even if highly corrupt, an independent judiciary may reduce total corruption.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2011. Vol. 12, no 1, 75-88 p.
Keyword [en]
Judiciaries, Corruption, Divided power
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-53635DOI: 10.1007/s10101-010-0082-yOAI: diva2:391061
Available from: 2011-01-24 Created: 2011-01-24 Last updated: 2011-04-29Bibliographically approved

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Priks, Mikael
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