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Social Interactions and Spillovers
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
2011 (English)In: Games and Economic Behavior, ISSN 0899-8256, E-ISSN 1090-2473, Vol. 72, no 2, 339-360 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The aim of this paper is to provide a tractable model where both socialization (or network formation) and productive efforts can be analyzed simultaneously. This permits a full-fledged equilibrium/welfare analysis of network formation with endogenous productive efforts and heterogeneous agents. We show that there exist two stable interior equilibria, which we can Pareto rank. The socially efficient outcome lies between these two equilibria. When the intrinsic returns to production and socialization increase, all equilibrium actions decrease at the Pareto-superior equilibrium, while they increase at the Pareto-inferior equilibrium. In both cases, the percentage change in socialization effort is higher (in absolute value) than that of the productive effort.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2011. Vol. 72, no 2, 339-360 p.
Keyword [en]
Peer effects, Network formation, Welfare
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-53640DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.010ISI: 000292482700002OAI: diva2:391070
Available from: 2011-01-24 Created: 2011-01-24 Last updated: 2012-01-17Bibliographically approved

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Zenou, Yves
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