2010 (English)Conference paper (Other academic)
Interviewing in professional labor markets is a costly process for
.rms. Moreover, poor screening can have a persistent negative impact
on .rms.bottom lines and candidates. careers. In a simple dynamic
model where .rms can pay a cost to interview applicants who have pri-
vate information about their own ability, potentially large ine¢ ciencies
arise from information-based unemployment, where able workers are
rejected by .rms because of their lack of o¤ers in previous interviews.
This e¤ect may make the market less e¢ cient than random matching.
We show that e¢ ciency can be achieved using either a mechanism with
transfers or one without transfers.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Recruiting, Interview costs, Asymmetric Information, Professional Labor Markets
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-53688OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-53688DiVA: diva2:391128
Econometric Society World Congress, Shanghai