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Do We Really Need Medical Experts when modelling in Judgment Analysis?: Lack of Difference Between Expert and Non-Expert models in Judgment Analysis
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
Center for Family and Community Medicine, Karolinska Institutet .
Center for Family and Community Medicine, Karolinska Institutet .
Center for Family and Community Medicine, Karolinska Institutet .
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(English)Article in journal (Refereed) Submitted
Abstract [en]

It is assumed that in judgment analysis, experts provide better models than non-experts. In this study we challenge this view by showing that data from non-experts might be equally suitable for building models. We show this by modeling the decisions of 21 medical students, 27 general practitioners, and 22 cardiologists on real patient vignettes regarding diagnosing heart failure. The models used were logistic regression and fast and frugal models. Results showed that there were no differences between any of the expertise groups in terms of fit, prediction, information searched, or percent of actual diagnosis in any of the models. Therefore, it seems, at least for the studied conditions, using models built on decision data from non-experts versus experts might be equally valid in judgment analysis.

Keyword [en]
Judgment analysis, Expertise, Decision making, Judgment
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-57072OAI: diva2:414263
Available from: 2011-05-02 Created: 2011-05-02 Last updated: 2011-05-09Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Decision Strategies: Something Old, Something New, and Something Borrowed
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Decision Strategies: Something Old, Something New, and Something Borrowed
2011 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

In this thesis, some old decision strategies are investigated and a new one that furthers our understanding of how decisions are made is introduced. Three studies are presented. In Study I and II, strategies are investigated in terms of inferences and in Study III, strategies are investigated in terms of preferences. Inferences refer to decisions regarding facts, e.g., whether a patient has a heart disease or not. Preferences refer to decision makers’ personal preferences between different choice alternatives, e.g., which flat out of many to choose. In all three studies, both non-compensatory strategies and compensatory strategies were investigated. In compensatory strategies, a high value in one attribute cannot compensate for a low value in another, while in non-compensatory strategies such compensation is possible. Results from Study I showed that both compensatory (logistic regression) and non-compensatory (fast and frugal) strategies make inferences equally well, but logistic regression strategies are more frugal (i.e., use fewer cues) than the fast and frugal strategies. Study II showed that the results were independent of the degree of expertise. The good inferential ability of both non-compensatory and compensatory strategies suggests there might be room for a strategy that can combine the strengths of the two. Study III introduces such a strategy, the Concordant-ranks (CR) strategy. Results from Study III showed that choices and attractiveness evaluations followed this new strategy. This strategy dictates a choice of an alternative with concordant ranks between attribute values and attribute weights when alternatives are about equally attractive. CR also serves as a proxy for finding the alternative with the shortest distance to an ideal. The CR strategy combines the computational simplicity of non-compensatory strategies with the superior information integration ability of compensatory strategies.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: Department of Psychology, Stockholms University, 2011. 80 p.
Decision strategies, inference, preference, compensatory, non-compensatory
National Category
Research subject
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-57174 (URN)978-91-7447-294-3 (ISBN)
Public defence
2011-06-03, David Magnussonsalen (U31), hus 8, Frescati Hagväg 8, Stockholm, 10:00 (English)
At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 1: Submitted. Paper 2: Submitted.Available from: 2011-05-12 Created: 2011-05-03 Last updated: 2011-05-09Bibliographically approved

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