References$(function(){PrimeFaces.cw("TieredMenu","widget_formSmash_upper_j_idt145",{id:"formSmash:upper:j_idt145",widgetVar:"widget_formSmash_upper_j_idt145",autoDisplay:true,overlay:true,my:"left top",at:"left bottom",trigger:"formSmash:upper:referencesLink",triggerEvent:"click"});}); $(function(){PrimeFaces.cw("OverlayPanel","widget_formSmash_upper_j_idt146_j_idt148",{id:"formSmash:upper:j_idt146:j_idt148",widgetVar:"widget_formSmash_upper_j_idt146_j_idt148",target:"formSmash:upper:j_idt146:permLink",showEffect:"blind",hideEffect:"fade",my:"right top",at:"right bottom",showCloseIcon:true});});

Bayesian Inference in Structural Second-Price Auctions with both Private-Value and Common-Value BiddersPrimeFaces.cw("AccordionPanel","widget_formSmash_some",{id:"formSmash:some",widgetVar:"widget_formSmash_some",multiple:true}); PrimeFaces.cw("AccordionPanel","widget_formSmash_all",{id:"formSmash:all",widgetVar:"widget_formSmash_all",multiple:true});
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PrimeFaces.cw("AccordionPanel","widget_formSmash_responsibleOrgs",{id:"formSmash:responsibleOrgs",widgetVar:"widget_formSmash_responsibleOrgs",multiple:true}); (English)Manuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
##### Abstract [en]

##### National Category

Probability Theory and Statistics
##### Research subject

Statistics
##### Identifiers

URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-57276OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-57276DiVA: diva2:415132
#####

PrimeFaces.cw("AccordionPanel","widget_formSmash_j_idt375",{id:"formSmash:j_idt375",widgetVar:"widget_formSmash_j_idt375",multiple:true});
#####

PrimeFaces.cw("AccordionPanel","widget_formSmash_j_idt381",{id:"formSmash:j_idt381",widgetVar:"widget_formSmash_j_idt381",multiple:true});
#####

PrimeFaces.cw("AccordionPanel","widget_formSmash_j_idt387",{id:"formSmash:j_idt387",widgetVar:"widget_formSmash_j_idt387",multiple:true});
Available from: 2011-05-05 Created: 2011-05-05 Last updated: 2011-05-09Bibliographically approved
##### In thesis

Auctions with asymmetric bidders have been actively studied in recent years. Tan and Xing (2011) show the existence of monotone pure-strategy equilibrium in auctions with both private-value and common-value bidders. The equilibrium bid function is given as the solution to an ordinary differential equation (ODE). We approximate the ODE and obtain a very accurate, approximate inverse bid as an explicit function of a given bid. This results in fast and numerically stable likelihood evaluations, which is an extremely valuable property for inference. We propose a model where the valuations of both common-value and private-value bidders are functions of covariates. The probability of being a common-value bidder is modeled by a logistic regression model with Bayesian variable selection. The model is estimated on a dataset of eBay coin auctions. We analyze the model using Bayesian methods implemented via a Metropolis-within-Gibbs algorithm. The posterior inference of the common-value part of the model is similar to the ones obtained from a model with only common-value bidders, whereas the private-value part of the model is more affected by the introduction of common-value bidders. There is on average a slightly larger probability for a bidder to be a common-value bidder, but this probability depends very little on the auction-specific covariates.

1. Bayesian Inference in Structural Second-Price Auctions$(function(){PrimeFaces.cw("OverlayPanel","overlay415150",{id:"formSmash:j_idt647:0:j_idt651",widgetVar:"overlay415150",target:"formSmash:j_idt647:0:parentLink",showEvent:"mousedown",hideEvent:"mousedown",showEffect:"blind",hideEffect:"fade",appendToBody:true});});

References$(function(){PrimeFaces.cw("TieredMenu","widget_formSmash_lower_j_idt1080",{id:"formSmash:lower:j_idt1080",widgetVar:"widget_formSmash_lower_j_idt1080",autoDisplay:true,overlay:true,my:"left top",at:"left bottom",trigger:"formSmash:lower:referencesLink",triggerEvent:"click"});}); $(function(){PrimeFaces.cw("OverlayPanel","widget_formSmash_lower_j_idt1081_j_idt1083",{id:"formSmash:lower:j_idt1081:j_idt1083",widgetVar:"widget_formSmash_lower_j_idt1081_j_idt1083",target:"formSmash:lower:j_idt1081:permLink",showEffect:"blind",hideEffect:"fade",my:"right top",at:"right bottom",showCloseIcon:true});});