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Natural selection and multiple realisation: A closer look
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
2013 (English)In: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ISSN 0269-8595, E-ISSN 1469-9281, I, Vol. 27, no 1, 73-83 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The target of this paper is the claim that natural selection accounts for the multiple realisation of biological and psychological kinds. I argue that the explanation actually offered doesn’t provide any insight about the phenomenon since it presupposes multiple realisation as an unexplained premise, and this is what does all the work. The purported explanation mistakenly invokes the “indifference” of selection to structure as an additional explanatorily relevant factor. While such indifference can be explanatory in intentional contexts it isn’t a causal factor at all in non-intentional nature. The upshot is that once the necessary initial assumption about heterogeneity is accepted there is no further explanation to do.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2013. Vol. 27, no 1, 73-83 p.
National Category
Philosophy History of Ideas
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-63298DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2013.783972ISI: 000325092600005OAI: diva2:448276

AuthorCount: 1;

Available from: 2011-10-14 Created: 2011-10-14 Last updated: 2015-08-20Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Deflating selection: On the interpretation and application of evolutionary theory
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Deflating selection: On the interpretation and application of evolutionary theory
2011 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Although the theory of evolution is well-established it nevertheless presents us with a few unresolved matters of interpretation. One key task is to get clear about what exactly one should take the term 'natural selection' to denote. Is natural selection a causal factor that causes evolutionary change and that has driven the process of evolution from relatively simple beginnings to the current state of biological complexity, or is it a "mere" consequence of the appearance of novel forms in relatively stable environments? Does evolutionary theory present us with a set of specifically evolutionary causes, natural selection being the most important? The answers to these questions have repercussions for what we may rightly take appeals to natural selection to explain, and how we are to relate evolutionary theory to neighbouring sciences. The first paper of this compilation thesis, as well as the appendix, deals with these questions at length, and come out supporting a non-causal interpretation. It is argued that it is redundant to posit natural selection as a cause of evolutionary change, and that the idea promotes misunderstanding of the evolutionary process. The second paper criticises the attempt to invoke natural selection in accounting for the heterogeneity of realisation within functionally defined biological categories. It is argued that the purported explanation is mistaken in a way that reflects the misconception of selection that is inherent in the causal interpretation. The paper furthermore presents a hypothesis that constitutes an additional theme in the thesis; that evolutionary discourse is influenced by pre-theoretical "leakage" due to the terms used and their entrenched meanings. The third paper argues that we have no reason to adopt an essentially etiological conception of biological functions. It is argued that the seeming reasonableness of essentially etiological functions stems from a pre-theoretical mindset that lacks theoretical justification. Standard etiological accounts unpack the notion of function in terms of selection, and so this discussion is related to the question of interpreting the inventory of evolutionary theory. The fourth paper discusses the relation between evolutionary discourse and intentional psychology. The background is that evolutionary considerations are quite commonly presented in terms connoting intent and motivation, and that the evolutionary and psychological perspectives are not always kept apart. The last paper is a metaphilosophical contribution that emanated from my engagement with the debate about biological functions.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, 2011. 24 p.
ambiguity, causal factor, drift, evolutionary theory, force, function, intentional psychology, interpretation, multiple realisation, natural selection, philosophical method, pre-theoretical influence, redundancy
National Category
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-63255 (URN)978-91-7447-367-4 (ISBN)
Public defence
2011-11-26, hörsal 9, hus D, Universitetsvägen 10 D, Stockholm, 10:00 (English)
At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 2: Submitted. Paper 3: Accepted. Available from: 2011-11-02 Created: 2011-10-13 Last updated: 2011-10-25Bibliographically approved

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