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Strategic risk and coordination failure in blame games
Stockholm School of Economics.
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
2011 (English)In: Economics Letters, ISSN 0165-1765, Vol. 110, no 2, 90-92 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Within a class of games that we call Blame Games, we discuss how strategic risk may discourage play of a unique and efficient (strictly) dominance solvable equilibrium.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2011. Vol. 110, no 2, 90-92 p.
Keyword [en]
Coordination games, Weak-link games, Coordination failure, Strategic risk
National Category
Economics and Business
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-67478DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.10.018ISI: 000288309200006OAI: diva2:470617


Available from: 2011-12-29 Created: 2011-12-28 Last updated: 2013-09-09Bibliographically approved

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