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On lying: intentionality, implicature, and imprecision
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Baltic Languages, Finnish and German. Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, Germany.
2011 (English)In: Intercultural Pragmatics, ISSN 1612-295X, Vol. 8, no 2, 277-292 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Although lying is a classical topic in philosophy, and certainly is very important in everyday life, there is a lack of genuine linguistic analyses of lying. In this article, lying is viewed as a speech act of insincere assertion. The liar misrepresents truth in order to deceive. While definitions like this are fairly common, consequences for the semantics/pragmatics interface, and, more importantly, for the ongoing debate about minimalism versus contextualism, never have been worked out in detail. This is what the article aims at, concentrating on three relevant issues, namely intentionality, implicature, and imprecision. It takes a moderate contextualist stand by showing that the possibility of lying is built into the language, thus allowing speakers to manipulate the representation of truth according to certain social goals. A case in point would be lying while saying the truth; in this case, the risk of being caught in the act of lying is reduced.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2011. Vol. 8, no 2, 277-292 p.
National Category
Languages and Literature
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-68097DOI: 10.1515/IPRG.2011.013ISI: 000292682500005OAI: diva2:472656

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Available from: 2012-01-04 Created: 2012-01-03 Last updated: 2015-03-17Bibliographically approved

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