Change search
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Advance Directives and Personal Identity: What’s the Problem?
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
2012 (English)In: Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, ISSN 0360-5310, E-ISSN 1744-5019, Vol. 37, no 1, 60-73 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The personal identity problem expresses the worry that due to disrupted psychological continuity, one person’s advance directive could be used to determine the care of a different person. Even ethicists, who strongly question the possibility of the scenario depicted by the proponents of the personal identity problem, often consider it to be a very potent objection to the use of advance directives. Aiming to question this assumption, I, in this paper, discuss the personal identity problem’s relevance to the moral force of advance directives. By putting the personal identity argument in relation to two different normative frameworks, I aim to show that whether or not the personal identity problem is relevant to the moral force of advance directives, and further, in what way it is relevant, depends entirely on what normative reasons we have for respecting advance directives in the first place.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2012. Vol. 37, no 1, 60-73 p.
National Category
Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-68771DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhr055ISI: 000299786600005OAI: diva2:473451
Available from: 2012-01-06 Created: 2012-01-06 Last updated: 2012-05-31Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text

Other links

Publisher's full text

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Furberg, Elisabeth
By organisation
Department of Philosophy
In the same journal
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy
Philosophy, Ethics and Religion

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

Altmetric score

Total: 85 hits
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link