An evolutionary dynamic of revolutions
2012 (English)In: Public Choice, ISSN 0048-5829, E-ISSN 1573-7101, Vol. 151, no 3-4, 497-515 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
It has been argued that rational choice theory is unable to explain the occurrence of social revolutions. This paper argues that if social revolutions are modeled in an evolutionary setting it is possible to predict when revolutions occur. It is shown that revolutions are expected to occur when regimes lose their determination to punish revolutionary activity early and severely. In the process of constructing the model some results about public good provision are generalized.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2012. Vol. 151, no 3-4, 497-515 p.
Revolutions, Evolution, Public goods, Evolutionary game theory
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-76035DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9755-xISI: 000297818800005OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-76035DiVA: diva2:525822