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Competition among officials and the abuse of power
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
2012 (English)In: Public Choice, ISSN 0048-5829, E-ISSN 1573-7101, Vol. 150, no 3-4, 425-438 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Traditional economic theory suggests that competition among officials providing government goods tends to reduce corruption. However, empirical evidence does not yet support this view. In this paper, I show that a corrupt and powerful central authority can use competition among officials to amass resources for itself. While competition reduces corruption at the lower level of government, corruption at the higher level of government is increased. To avoid widespread theft from the central authority, competing officials are monitored more intensively than a monopolist. Hence, even though competition among officials generates more consumer surplus, it may reduce welfare.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2012. Vol. 150, no 3-4, 425-438 p.
Keyword [en]
Corruption, Competition
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-76957DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9709-3ISI: 000297817800002OAI: diva2:535312
1Available from: 2012-06-19 Created: 2012-05-28 Last updated: 2012-06-19Bibliographically approved

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Priks, Mikael
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