Change search
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Essays on Macroeconomics and Political Economy
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics. Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
2012 (English)Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This thesis consists of three self-contained essays dealing with different aspects of macroeconomics and political Economy.

The Relative Price of Investment Goods and Sectoral Contract Dependence

I develop a quantitative model to explain the relationship between TFPs at the aggregate and sector levels and contracting institutions across countries. The incomplete contract enforcement induces distortions in the production process which come from the “hold up” problem between a final goods firm and its suppliers. Because investment goods sector is more contract dependent, its productivity suffers more from the distortion. In turn, countries endowed with weaker contract enforcement institutions face higher relative prices of investment goods.

A Ricardian Model of the Labor Market with Directed Search

I analyze how search friction affects the allocation in a Ricardian model of the labor market. The equilibrium shows that the matching pattern is partially mixed: Some tasks are only performed by skilled workers; some are only performed by unskilled workers; the remaining tasks are performed by both skilled and unskilled workers. The mixed matching pattern implies a mismatch in equilibrium. It turns out that the reason for the mismatch has its roots in search friction. In addition, I show labor market institutions have interesting implications for the unemployment rate and mismatch.

A Dynamic Analysis of the Free-rider Problem

I argue that special interest groups overcome their free-rider problem thanks to distorted government policy. As policy confers monopoly privileges on a group, it can also preserve and promote group’s organization. The key to sustaining the organization of the group is a dynamic incentive: when distorted policy generates rents for a group, each member of the group wish to make contributions not just to raise their rents today; they want to sustain their cooperation so that they will be able to influence policy in the future.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: Department of Economics, Stockholm University , 2012. , 144 p.
Monograph series / Institute for International Economic Studies, University of Stockholm, ISSN 0346-6892 ; 76
Keyword [en]
Relative price, Bargaining, Incomplete contract, Ricardian model of labor market, directed search, Free-rider problem, Markov perfect equilibrium
National Category
Research subject
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-78857ISBN: 978-91-7447-537-1OAI: diva2:544810
Public defence
2012-09-26, William-Olssonsalen, Geovetenskapens hus, Svante Arrhenius väg 14, Stockholm, 13:00 (English)
Available from: 2012-09-04 Created: 2012-08-16 Last updated: 2013-01-10Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

fulltext(850 kB)315 downloads
File information
File name FULLTEXT01.pdfFile size 850 kBChecksum SHA-512
Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Ge, Jinfeng
By organisation
Department of EconomicsInstitute for International Economic Studies

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
Total: 315 downloads
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

Total: 540 hits
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link