Change search
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Truth as an epistemic notion
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
2012 (English)In: Topoi (Dordrecht), ISSN 0167-7411, E-ISSN 1572-8749, Vol. 31, no 1, 9-16 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

What is the appropriate notion of truth for sentences whose meanings are understood in epistemic terms such as proof or ground for an assertion? It seems that the truth of such sentences has to be identified with the existence of proofs or grounds, and the main issue is whether this existence is to be understood in a temporal sense as meaning that we have actually found a proof or a ground, or if it could be taken in an abstract, tenseless sense. Would the latter alternative amount to realism with respect to proofs or grounds in a way that would be contrary to the supposedly anti-realistic standpoint underlying the epistemic understanding of linguistic expressions? Before discussing this question, I shall consider reasons for construing linguistic meaning epistemically and relations between such reasons and reasons for taking an anti-realist point of view towards the discourse in question.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2012. Vol. 31, no 1, 9-16 p.
Keyword [en]
Truth, Intuitionism, Anti-realism, Meaning-theory
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-80737DOI: 10.1007/s11245-011-9107-6ISI: 000303454300003OAI: diva2:558637


Available from: 2012-10-04 Created: 2012-09-27 Last updated: 2012-10-04Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text

Other links

Publisher's full text

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Prawitz, Dag
By organisation
Department of Philosophy
In the same journal
Topoi (Dordrecht)

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

Altmetric score

Total: 116 hits
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link