Institutions, Political Cycles and Corruption: Essays on Dynamic Political Economy of Government
2012 (English)Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
This thesis consists of three essays in Political Economy:
“China’s Political Business Cycle” uncovers the fact that the timing of China’s business cycle correlates to the timing of the Communist Party’s Congress and constructs a theory to explain the mechanism of the political business cycle. An empirical test of the theory derives a result consistent with the predictions of the theory.
“A Theory of Dynastic Cycle” provides a politico-economic theory to explain the mechanism of the dynastic cycle, a repeating pattern in China’s theory. The core of the theory is the ruler’s trade-off between the political account and the economic account in choosing a successor.
“A Politico-Economic Theory of Corruption in Non-Democracy” investigates the ruler’s incentive to have corrupt agents. The key point is that a corrupt agent has a bad reputation and is less likely to replace the incumbent ruler. The major implication is that unless there is fundamental institutional change, it is hard to eradicate corruption in non-democracy.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: Department of Economics, Stockholm Univeristy , 2012. , 169 p.
Monograph series / Institute for International Economic Studies, University of Stockholm, ISSN 0346-6892 ; 76
Institutions, Political Cycles, Corruption
Research subject Economics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-83374ISBN: 978-91-7447-596-8OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-83374DiVA: diva2:575434
2013-01-21, William-Olssonsalen, Geovetenskapens hus, Svante Arrhenius väg 14, Stockholm, 13:00 (English)
Padró i Miquel, Gerard, Professor
Hassler, John, Professor