Every Viewer Has a Price : on the Differentiation of TV Channels
2012 (English)In: Journal of Media Economics, ISSN 0899-7764, E-ISSN 1532-7736, Vol. 25, no 4, 220-243 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
The authors analyzed the implications of targeted advertising on the equilibrium level of channel profile differentiation (e.g., in terms of political positioning), in free-to-air broadcasting industries. When consumers have no preferences over program content (e.g., entertainment vs. news) standard Hotelling type results apply. Market forces minimize differentiation while the optimal degree is at an intermediate level. As preferences over program content get somewhat stronger, the difference between optimal and market outcomes is initially reduced. However, when preferences over program content get more pronounced, minimal differentiation suddenly becomes optimal while market forces lead to excessive differentiation. Hence, policies aimed at increasing diversity are beneficial only when viewers care little about differences in program content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Journal of Media Economics is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2012. Vol. 25, no 4, 220-243 p.
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-85648DOI: 10.1080/08997764.2012.729547OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-85648DiVA: diva2:584174